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Foreword
Closed views typically picture Islam as undifferentiated, static and monolithic, and as intolerant of 
internal pluralism and deliberation ... in short, debates and differences which are taken for granted 
amongst non-Muslims are neither seen nor heard when they take place within Islam.1
In Runnymede’s path-breaking report of 1997, Islamophobia – a Challenge for Us All,2 we set out to 
capture the extent and forms of anti-Muslim prejudice in Britain. The Commission on British Muslims and 
Islamophobia could not at the time have predicted the prominence within race and ethnic relations that 
the issues they sought to address would take. Notably, Claire Alexander observes in this volume that ‘as 
the “colour line” was for the early 20th century, “The Muslim Question” has become the defining issue of 
our times’. Since 1997 we have seen a shift in domestic and international policy from a focus on equality 
and justice to issues of security and cohesion, and from race and ethnicity to religion. These policy shifts 
have been marked by a tendency to essentialize Muslim people and their communities as a means of 
compartmentalizing them, as governments have sought to exercise control and respond to moral panics. 
Seen through the prism of risk, incompatible difference and self-segregation, Muslims in Britain have become 
the talisman of the ‘post-colonial melancholia’3 that typifies the UK’s race relations debate. The actions of 
those extremists who resort to violence in the name of Islam have given succour to those who would argue 
that Britishness and ‘Muslim-ness’ are incompatible, regardless of the protestations of the overwhelming 
majority of British Muslims, who in their attitudes and actions show that British identities are both capacious 
enough to include Muslim identities, and are enhanced by the ethnic and religious diversity which Muslims 
continue to bring to our society.
In this collection we have sought to challenge dominant representations of Muslims in Britain by gathering 
the views and insights of researchers who have been seeking to understand the contemporary identities 
of those racialized as Muslim in the UK and the politics which surrounds their presence. We hope in some 
small way to counter the dominant understandings of British Muslim identities where these are based on 
falsehoods and generalizations, and to highlight the complexities, nuances and diversity of identities among 
Muslims in Britain. We do this as part of our ongoing project to ensure that our public policy debates and 
civil society discussions are based on robust, evidence-based analysis rather than sensationalist, knee-jerk 
responses. In the coming weeks and months, our government will be revisiting its approach to integration 
and security in the light of the monstrous terrorist attack in Woolwich, South London. We hope that the 
perspectives presented in this collection occasion some pause for thought so that any policy developments 
in this area contribute to, rather than detract from, the task of building a successful multi-ethnic society.
Rob Berkeley
Director, Runnymede
July 2013
1 Commission on British Muslims and Islamophobia (1997) Islamophobia – A Challenge for Us All. London: The Runnymede Trust, p.5.
2 Op cit. 
3 Paul Gilroy (2005) Post-colonial Melancholia. New York: Columbia University Press.
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Introduction: The New Muslims
Claire Alexander, Victoria Redclift and Ajmal Hussain
University of Manchester
In their pathbreaking report published in 1997, 
Islamophobia: A Challenge for Us All, Runnymede 
examined the growth, features and consequences 
of anti-Muslim racism in Britain. The report 
warned then about the dangers of ‘closed’ 
views of Islam and Muslims, and pressured for 
a more ‘open’ perspective and dialogue, not 
only as a way of countering anti-Muslim racism 
but as a necessity ‘for the well-being of society 
as a whole’. Sixteen years on, it seems that the 
challenge remains as vital today as it did then – 
perhaps even more so.
The past two decades have seen an explosion 
of interest in Muslim communities in Britain and 
Europe. Migration and demographic change 
have contributed to a growing Muslim presence 
in Europe, while the context of the global War on 
Terror and the resurgence of mainstream right-
wing and Far Right political parties across Europe 
has fed heated discussions around the so-called 
‘clash of civilizations’, the borders and identity of 
‘Fortress Europe’ and the possibilities and limits 
of citizenship.
In the wake of the 2001 ‘riots’ and the terror 
attacks of 11 September 2001 and 7 July 2005, 
Britain has experienced an intense political, 
media and policy scrutiny of British Muslims. 
These three events have triggered a two-fold 
approach to ‘managing’ Muslims – with a focus 
on securitization and migration control at the 
borders, and, internally, on issues of integration, 
cohesion and citizenship. Such policies have 
impacted on all dimensions of Muslim life, from 
travel ‘back home’ to the intimacies of marriage 
and family formation, from schools to prisons, 
from political protest to religious practice, 
from internet usage to stop and search, from 
friendships to mode of dress.
On the one hand, the focus on religion, culture 
and community has marked Muslims out as 
distinct from the larger political, social and 
cultural landscape of 21st-century Britain, and 
any broader struggle for racial equality and 
justice. On the other hand, Muslims have found 
themselves homogenized and ‘flattened’ into a 
single category or ‘community’ defined solely 
through faith, which is itself a shorthand for a 
range of pathologies. Such understandings not 
only ignore the internal diversity of ‘Muslims’ – 
whether around ethnicity, gender, class, sexuality, 
age, religiosity, region and so on – but also erase 
the complex ways in which Muslim identities are 
lived.
The ‘facts’ about Muslims in Britain themselves 
challenge us to think anew. The 2011 Census, for 
example, reveals a growing number of Muslims, 
but also a changing trajectory in the ethnic make-
up and patterns of Muslim settlement in the UK. 
An increase in Muslims living in areas outside 
cities gives rise to new contexts and textures 
for Muslim life. How Muslims connect with new 
environments, as well as with fellow Muslims 
and non-Muslims across spaces of old and new 
settlement, minority and majority communities, 
prompts us to rethink assumptions about ‘parallel 
lives’ and community cohesion. Similarly, the 
engagement of a new generation of British 
Muslims with forms of political and social action 
around issues of faith – as well as other struggles 
for social justice – suggests an urgent need to 
rethink outmoded and simplistic ideas of religion, 
culture, ethnicity and difference.
Our aim in this collection is to challenge the 
ways in which ‘Muslims’ as a social category 
are imagined in popular, policy and even some 
academic circles. The title ‘New Muslims’ 
indexes both this conceptual shift and the 
changing contours of ‘the Muslim community’ 
in 21st-century Britain. It argues for renewed 
assessments of Muslims in Britain today – beyond 
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the discourses of securitization, segregation or 
sharia law – to recognize the multidimensionality 
of Muslim lives and their place within a broader 
struggle for equality, citizenship and social justice.
The Muslim Question and 
The New Muslims
This collection originates from a recent workshop 
on The New Muslims and a panel debate on 
The Muslim Question, both held in March 2013 
at the University of Manchester. In Section I: 
The Muslim Question, four scholars working on 
Muslim identities, from a range of perspectives, 
explore and challenge dominant discourses 
around Muslim identities in the UK.1 In Section II: 
The New Muslims, we bring together established 
and emerging scholars to present research 
that unsettles the conventional understanding 
of Muslim identities in Britain and its diaspora 
– research that provides unexpected and 
challenging insights into how we think (about) 
Muslims. The work presented here points to the 
multiple levels at which Muslim identities must 
be understood, from transnational connections, 
to national representations (and the precarity 
of British Muslim citizenships) and the local 
formations of Muslim life.
The emphasis here is very much on placing 
Muslim lives and identities in context through 
exploring the everyday places in which British 
Muslims live – cities, schools, youth clubs – and 
some more surprising points of access – the 
army, radio stations, cars – all offering alternative 
starting-points for the unravelling of Muslim 
identities. While we can only gesture here towards 
some of the richness of this and other academic 
work in the field, we hope that this collection 
will challenge, provoke and inspire others to 
think differently about the question of Muslims in 
Britain.
Notes
1 A film on ‘The Muslim Question’ can be viewed 
at http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=2jFI1jFZk_c.
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Introduction
It is an interesting – and perhaps revealing – 
paradox that the discussion around Muslims in 
Britain stands in inverse proportion to the debates 
around race equality; that, over the past 25 years, 
since The Satanic Verses affair brought Muslims 
crashing into the public consciousness, issues of 
religion have been at the forefront of media, policy 
and popular concern, while issues of racism, social 
justice and equality have largely fallen off the map. 
This is not to argue that Muslims have unfairly 
benefited from this (mostly negative) attention – 
quite the reverse – but it is to suggest that issues 
of religion and identity have been foregrounded in 
ways that have provided a distraction from issues 
of equality, and have tended to reify notions of 
difference between minority communities, and 
between minority and majority communities, rather 
than promote solidarity, recognition and common 
struggle.
My view is, of course, a partial one, and one which 
comes from 20 years of research in race and 
ethnicity, rather than religion (unlike my co-authors). 
My interest in Muslims is largely accidental. It stems 
from my earlier research on Asian youth identities 
(Alexander, 2000), which began in the mid-1990s 
when the moral panic du jour was ‘Asian gangs’, 
but which with the turn of the Millennium became 
transmuted into ‘Muslim gangs’, and then ‘Muslims’ 
in general. Revisiting this research, and its original 
participants, a decade and a half later,1 it is clear 
the shift is a defining one, not only in terms of the 
broader social and political context, but in terms of 
the ‘hearts and minds’ of individuals, families and 
communities, if in multiple complex and sometimes 
contradictory ways.
It may be possible to argue, indeed, that as ‘the 
color line’ was for the early 20th century, ‘The 
Muslim Question’ has become the defining issue of 
our times. It provides a lens that covers everything 
from the global ‘clash of civilizations’, to the national 
borders of migration, citizenship and belonging, 
to the issue of community cohesion and the 
encounters between neighbours. Nevertheless, 
a focus on ‘The Muslim Question’ – or its implicit 
synonym ‘The Muslim Problem’ – raises a number 
of issues for research and policy around race 
equality. Here I want to focus on three of them.
1. What is at Stake in The 
Muslim Question?
Research on Muslims has exploded in the past 
two decades, and particularly in the period after 
2001, when issues of racial discrimination became 
transformed into claims of self-segregation, 
equality became a matter of cohesion, and ethnic 
or religious difference became matters of security. 
Increasingly and explicitly, research has become 
linked to government and policy agendas, both 
at home and abroad. This has filtered academic 
research and knowledge production through the 
lens of policy and ‘impact’, which not only defines 
‘what counts’ as worthy of research but also the 
terms in which it is understood – usually as a 
problem. It is interesting to reflect that when I was 
looking for a publisher for The Asian Gang in the 
late 1990s a senior editor at a major publishing 
house told me that no-one was interested in Asian 
youth because they were ‘too dull’. This changed 
dramatically after 2001, at least as long as the 
‘Asians’ are ‘Muslims’. These days it seems one 
only has to add the word ‘Muslim’ to a project to get 
SECTION I: THE MUSLIM QUESTION
1. The Muslim Question(s): Reflections from 
a Race and Ethnic Studies Perspective
Claire Alexander
University of Manchester
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funding, find a publisher or claim a spot on a Radio 
4 talkshow. But is Thinking Allowed?
What does it mean to do research at a time of such 
heightened surveillance? What does it mean to 
do work on Muslims when any form of knowledge 
production is so freighted with significance and 
potential harm and when the parameters of a 
debate are always already so overdetermined from 
without? What constitutes a critical intervention? 
Does the seemingly unending focus on rituals, 
hijabs and arranged marriages really meet this 
challenge? Our desperate rehearsal of the mantra 
of the multiplicity and fluidity of identities may be 
a necessary script, but is it really a sufficient one? 
Does it ‘Bend the Twig’, to quote Stuart Hall (2009), 
in a context where David Cameron can talk about 
multiple identities as a remedy for extremism and 
use it as a stick to beat the Muslim community with 
still further?
2. Who Counts as Muslim?
My second question is around who counts as 
Muslim in The Muslim Question? And here my 
concern is about the tensions between invisibility 
and hypervisibility. Leaving aside the very interesting 
question of what the 2011 census reveals about who 
and where the Muslims are, my focus here is on 
who we THINK they are, and the ways in which this 
makes only particular groups and aspects visible. 
Usually we associate ‘Muslims’ with South Asians – 
logically, perhaps, given the demography – but this 
raises interesting overlaps with residual categories 
around race and ethnicity. There is increasing work 
on Somalis, who handily combine racial and religious 
marginality in one neat package for those who 
like their ‘problems’ multiplied. However, we know 
much less about Muslims from the Middle East, and 
particularly the super-rich who are more likely to be 
seen in the shops of Kensington and Chelsea than 
the streets of Bradford or Birmingham. 
This indicates that the term ‘Muslim’ is too often a 
codeword for a series of pathologies. If we think 
of dominant representations, they appear in three 
main categories: gender (the hijab/forced marriage/
honour killings triad), gangs and grooming, and 
terrorists/extremists. None of these are good … and 
all provide grist to the mill of the born-again racism-
without-race popular with both the EDL and the so-
called liberal left because, apparently, it’s not racist 
to be anti-Muslim.
This hypervisibility renders other, more mundane 
aspects of Muslim life invisible. What about the 
everyday spaces of Muslim life – the shopping 
malls, the schools, the workplace, the street? Do 
these more everyday spaces count as Muslim? 
Or in these everyday spaces do people stop 
being Muslim and just become people? Which is 
convenient, because then we don’t have to change 
the categories in which we think. On the downside, 
it doesn’t change the categories in which we think – 
and there are consequences to that.
3. What are the Implications 
for Race Equality?
My third question is to think about the relationship 
between race equality and religion in the 
construction of The Muslim Question. Of course, 
Runnymede was one of the first organizations 
to take seriously the issue and definition of 
Islamophobia in their 1997 report. They argued 
then that Islamophobia was ‘a challenge for us all’. 
But is it still? Since this period the race equality 
and religious equality agendas have become 
increasingly separate, and academic research 
in these areas has also become distinct. We 
could make the same argument about migration 
studies, and the danger is the same – that it is now 
seemingly possible to talk about religion without 
race and race without reference to religion. In 
the first instance we risk separating out Muslims 
from a broader struggle for equality, and in the 
second we run the risk of subsuming or erasing the 
differences between experiences, priorities, groups 
and subjectivities for a one-size-fits-all definition of 
racism. 
The singular focus on religion, like the focus 
on ethnicity or culture, tends to overlook cross-
cutting issues and alliances – around class for 
example, or gender – and it therefore erases 
commonality. We can think about figures that 
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show high levels of unemployment, educational 
underachievement, stop and search, poor housing, 
low levels of household wealth, the ‘ethnic penalty’ 
for professionals, and ask whether this is a ‘Muslim 
question’ and whether a focus on religion alone 
accounts for this, any more than a focus on race, 
culture or ethnicity? And does a focus on religion 
provide a solution? By the same token we could 
ask whether the response to social and ethnic 
inequality and discrimination is really the acquisition 
of multiple identities for Muslims as David Cameron 
would have us believe?
Seeing these experiences as distinct closes the 
possibility of dialogue and exchange, of alliance 
and recognition of overlapping categories, or of 
shared experiences of discrimination and exclusion, 
and it weakens the struggle against racism, 
inequality and exclusion. For me, this closure and 
silence is at the heart of the Muslim Question.
Notes
1 This new research, Revisiting the Asian Gang: 
Continuity, Change and Transformation, was 
funded by the ESRC (Award No: ES/1032274/1). I 
am grateful for their support.
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Introduction 
Why frame our discussion under the title of the 
‘Muslim Question’? Does it make for a different kind 
of conversation? Is it good to think with?
References to ‘Europe’s Muslim Question’ have 
increasingly been cropping up, post 9/11 and 7/7. 
Why now, and to what ends? Broadly speaking, 
I think we can divide them into two kinds. There 
are, on the one hand, those for whom the “Muslim 
Question” is merely a euphemism for the Muslim 
problem; and, on the other, those for whom, on the 
contrary, it names the problematization of Muslims. 
More fundamentally, there are those who think of 
the Muslim Question as a question or questions 
that demand answers and solutions, whether by 
refining policies or gaining a better knowledge of 
the facts on the ground; and there are those for 
whom the “Muslim Question” is a rhetorical device. 
For the first, the focus – of the problems and for 
the answers – is on Muslims; for the latter, it is 
instead on what the discursive construction of the 
Muslims as the problem discloses about Europe and 
European-ness (Sayyid, 2009).
Still, what the reference to the Muslim Question 
does for them all is work as shorthand. But 
shorthand for what? Arguably for the “Question” 
side of the term. We all know more or less what is 
meant by the Muslim Question (but only more or 
less) because we fill in for Muslims by historical 
analogy with the other “Questions” of ages past.
Actually, as both term and concept, “the Muslim 
Question” has its own long and loaded histories and 
contemporary resonances, to which Russia, India 
and the Balkans, and the French and British empires 
attest. Different contexts, different agents, different 
configurations: Imperial incorporation or the break-
up of empires, partition and nation-building, the 
movements of populations or the redrawing of state 
boundaries; intellectuals, politicians, missionaries or 
provocateurs; the nationality question, the minority 
question, ethnic or religious; marginal or dominant.
Yet, for all their critical relevance to such 
contemporary articulations of the “Muslim Question” 
as the governance of Muslims, these other, 
historical, “Muslim Questions” cannot be said to 
be the Questions evoked in current debates. “Our” 
contemporary “Muslim Question” is very much 
a (Western) European question, and a question 
of Liberalism (Parekh, 2008; Norton, 2013). Its 
historical imaginary is that of the European post-
Enlightenment political tradition and the struggles 
for emancipation, citizenship and equality which set 
its grammar: the Jewish, Catholic, Social, Women’s 
and Colour Questions which dominated 19th-
century politics.
But which one? The different “Questions” each 
have their own historical, contextual and discursive 
histories; their specific conditions of possibility 
and contemporary currencies as usable pasts. 
However much part of the same constellation, the 
different “Questions” of the 19th century politicized 
and managed the different differences of race and 
gender, class and nation, metropolis and colony, 
differently (Brown, 2006). If the point of the analogy 
were the shorthand, then it matters which Question 
the Muslim Question is read through.
Where the analogy is rendered explicit by 
some authors, it is mostly towards the “Jewish 
Question”. But it is worth noting two things. First, 
the coining and currency of the “Jewish Question” 
in the 1840s is owing to its having ‘caught on’ 
as a ‘political catchphrase’, and specifically as 
an “anti-Jewish battle-cry” (Toury, 1966). By 
contrast, what currency the “Muslim Question” 
as a neologism has attained today is, I’d argue, 
owed overwhelmingly more to the critics than to 
the peddlers of Islamophobia. Second, while for 
some authors the interest in drawing the analogy 
between the Muslim Question and the Jewish 
2. Doing the “Muslim Question” in Different Voices
AbdoolKarim Vakil
King’s College London
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Question is to read Jewish for Muslim, and the 
lessons of the historical experience of Jews for 
Muslims, arguably the critical work of the analogy 
is in the Question. It is metaphorical.
It would be a mistake to think that reference to 
the Muslim Question is an historical short-cut 
for thinking the Muslim problem through other 
problems, the contemporary Muslim experience 
through the historical experiences of others evoked 
by their Questions. The Jewish Question, like 
the Woman Question, and the other Questions, 
do not refer to specific, determinate questions 
and stable referents. The Muslim question is not 
shorthand for the Jewish question, the “Muslim 
Question” is shorthand for “the Muslim” as the 
“Jewish Question” is shorthand for “the Jew” (cf. 
Klug, 2012). What the “Muslim Question” makes 
present, what it enacts and dramatizes, then, is the 
scare quoting, the foregrounding of the fantasy of 
the “Muslim” in the “Muslim Question”. This is why 
Muslim Question talk is catching on. This is what 
the name brings to the discussion of our panel. 
The point of making the Question appear real is to 
legitimate solutions and interventions. The work of 
estranging it is critique.
References
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3. Engaged Muslim Citizenship in Europe
Nasar Meer
Northumbria University
Introduction: The ‘Muslim 
Question’ in Europe
Recent years have seen a series of political 
debates about the place of Muslims in Europe, 
something that has variously centred on topics of 
integration, security, discrimination and identity 
(Meer, 2012). These debates frequently present 
Muslims as newcomers to the European landmass 
(Caldwell, 2009; Steyn, 2006), ignoring how the 
majority are European through citizenship and have 
over generations made profound contributions 
to the social and cultural fabric of different 
nation-states. As such, and when we include 
historically established Muslims, of the Balkans, 
Mediterranean and indeed of the former Eastern 
bloc (e.g. Tartar communities in Poland), it has 
been said that Muslims are more numerous than 
Catholics in the traditionally Protestant north of 
Europe, and more numerous than Protestants in 
the traditionally Catholic south (Klausen, 2005).
Importantly, cross-national research is beginning 
to support more local (national) studies in finding 
that across Europe Muslims are more likely to be 
consistently socio-economically disadvantaged 
than other groups (with the exception of Roma and 
traveller communities), evidenced in higher levels 
of unemployment and lower levels of income (and 
are more likely to be employed in unskilled work) 
(Open Society Institute, 2010: 96). Unfortunately, 
disadvantage is not normally what occupies those 
posing the ‘Muslim Question’ – a reference to the 
‘Jewish Question’, which has previously haunted 
Europe and centred on what today we would 
describe as issues of integration for (and rejection 
of) Jewish minorities. While there are analogies 
between the racism encountered by Jewish and 
Muslim communities (Meer, 2013), it is important to 
stress that just as their Jewish counterparts before 
them, who have moved inwards from the margins 
of social and political life, Muslims have become 
active participants in democratic life, and so are 
not merely objects of discrimination.
The Pursuit of 
Citizenship: Integration, 
Accommodation, 
Organization
When we look across the European landmass 
we find Muslims are often innovating with Islam 
in Europe, as expressed in the idea of Euro-
Islam, perhaps pioneered by the Swiss-born 
philosopher Tariq Ramadan (2004), who describes 
it as a process already underway, and in which 
‘more and more young people and intellectuals 
are actively looking for a way to live in harmony 
with their faith, participating in the societies that 
are their societies’. Ramadan (2004) sees this as 
being ‘faithful to the principles of Islam, dressed in 
European and American cultures, and definitively 
rooted in Western societies’. This is not an 
uncommon approach, one that is both classicist 
and revisionist because it stakes out a resource (in 
Islamic scriptures) to propose a qualitatively novel 
solution – being a ‘native’ Muslim European in 
traditionally non-Muslim majority environments.
Where Muslims are not radically innovating they 
are pursuing well-established policy traditions 
within European states. For example, and contrary 
to popular claims, Muslims have not set up 
political parties seeking to establish the right to 
practise polygamy, FGM or forced marriages. 
Instead Muslim constituencies are often crafting 
a participatory space in the form of such things 
as provisions for Muslim schooling, discrimination 
legislation, the tools for social mobility and non-
derogatory representation in mainstream public 
and media discourses. We might call this the 
pursuit of citizenship. Europe boasts a rich public 
sphere and a series of dynamic civil societies that 
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have historically included and incorporated other 
religious minorities. The real question it needs to 
address is how to accommodate Muslims in a 
manner that will allow them to reconcile their faith 
and citizenship commitments.
It is important to remember that Muslims are 
not one homogeneous group. On the contrary, 
Muslim group identities in Europe – like Jewish 
and Catholic group identities – contain many social 
layers that are not a simple reflection of religious 
texts. This means that the appellation of ‘Muslim’ 
can be used without any agreement on Islamic 
matters. This point is under-studied and, as a 
consequence, when we talk about ‘Muslim leaders’ 
it would be useful to differentiate between: (1) how 
Muslims organize themselves or do not organize 
themselves; (2) what this tells us about self-
definitions of ‘Muslim’ in Europe; and (3) whether 
there is a European mould for the incorporation 
of Muslim organizations. Beginning with the first 
and second questions, there are, according to 
Neilsen (2004: 121), three main forms of Muslim 
organization which have developed among Muslim 
minorities in Western Europe: (a) groups which 
arose from local communities in terms of service 
provision and anti-discrimination; (b) groups set 
up as extensions of organizations or movements 
from their country of origin; and (c) groups set up 
by governments or government-related agencies to 
engage with them and national civil society.
During the 1990s the second (b) of Neilsen’s forms 
began to merge with the first (a), before giving 
way to the third (c). These were often modelled 
on corporatist organizations created by other, 
especially Jewish, faith groups; e.g. the Muslim 
Council of Britain (MCB) and the Zentralrat de 
Muslime in Deutschland (ZMD) both draw upon the 
precedents of Jewish bodies and organizations. 
Meanwhile the Conseil Français du Culte 
Musulman draws upon the Consitoire for Jews. 
The crucial point is that each Muslim organization 
has been framed within European agendas 
of democratic participation, and stakeholder 
representation and consultation, rather than as 
clerical or religious bodies per se.
Conclusion: Engaging 
Muslims?
While as yet embryonic, Muslims–state 
engagement points to a re-formulation of church–
state relations: indeed in 2003 the European Union 
discussed how to build bridges between faith 
communities, and especially how to integrate faith-
based representative bodies in wider frameworks 
of governance. Developments in Muslims–state 
engagement are therefore qualitatively novel and 
potentially profound, for they engage with all the 
questions of legitimacy – who speaks for Muslims 
and do they need to be ‘Islamic’ to be ‘Muslim’ 
leaders? How is this shaped by as well as shaping 
citizenship relations in the public domain? What 
are the similarities and differences both within and 
between different national approaches?  These are 
just some of the pressing questions that Muslims 
are asking themselves. The crucial point is that 
they are not questions about a clash of civilizations 
or jihad – they are political questions about 
democratic participation and representation, and 
so point to an engaged Muslim citizenry across 
Europe.
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4. Gendering the Muslim Question
Fauzia Ahmad
University of Bristol
Introduction
Speaking as a self-identified British Muslim woman, 
working with and researching British Muslim 
women, my response to the ‘Muslim Question’ is a 
personal and gendered one. For me, the ‘Muslim 
Question’ is a matter of multiple, context-specific 
questions, around who is defined as ‘Muslim’, but 
also including questions such as ‘who is asking?’ 
and ‘why?’ In particular I am interested in how 
Muslim women appear in and disappear from these 
discourses. My focus here is on the ways media 
and social policy have systematically failed Muslim 
women, through either repeating tired and unhelpful 
stereotypes, or failing to listen and respond to the 
social welfare needs identified by Muslim women’s 
grassroots organizations.
Representing Muslim 
Women
Within dominant media representations and 
political agendas around Muslim identities in the 
period following 9/11, Muslim women have come 
in for particular scrutiny. Whether in their role 
in transmitting Islam across the generations, or 
embodying difference in the issue of dress, ‘Muslim 
women’ and their bodies have become a site for 
renewed media and political surveillance and 
contestation.
High-profile controversies before 7/7, such as 
the case of Shabina Begum and her 2-year 
high court battle against her school to allow 
her to wear the jilbab (2004–2006), comments 
made in October 2006 by the then Leader of the 
House of Commons, Jack Straw, questioning the 
‘integration’ of young Muslim women wearing 
the niqab, and the subsequent banning of the 
niqab on some university campuses after they 
were deemed a ‘security risk’ following 7/7 have 
encouraged the expression and normalization of 
gendered Islamophobic sentiments in broadsheet 
newspapers and the tabloid press, and among 
MPs. They further highlight how Muslim women’s 
simultaneous apparent ‘victimhood’ and, ironically, 
their perceived threat to ‘British values’, continue 
to influence media reporting and government-led 
agendas. This ‘victim-focused’ and pathologized 
discourse is one that silences and obscures 
alternative forms of agency and difference, repeats 
simplistic ‘modern/Western’ versus ‘traditional/
Muslim’ dichotomous frameworks, and contributes 
to furthering distinctions of ‘us’ and ‘them’ (Ahmad, 
2010).
Regardless of the educational and professional 
achievements of large numbers of British Muslim 
women, only two types of Muslim woman are 
still readily accepted as ‘authentic’ within the 
public sphere. One is the oppressed victim; 
the other is the ‘rebel’, such as self-professed 
former Muslim Ayaan Hirsi Ali. Both voices 
appear to be legitimized as ‘authentic’ and 
‘brave’ because they are seen as dissenting from 
the Muslim (patriarchal) mainstream. Despite 
interventions by articulate and devout Muslim 
women across a range of contexts, attempting 
to make their voices heard, they are met with 
hostility, disbelief, disrespect and criticism of 
Islam and Muslims. It seems a Muslim woman is 
only a Muslim woman out of fear or is deluded 
by a form of ‘false consciousness’. Even within 
representations on television and film, Muslim 
women cannot simply ‘be’ without recourse to 
some reliance on pathology and stereotype. Such 
(mis)representations influence the development of 
social policies affecting Muslim women.
Muslim Women and Social 
Policy
Social policy vis-à-vis British Muslims in the 
post-9/11, post-7/7 era has continued to insist 
that ‘multiculturalism has failed’, without fully 
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appreciating the huge disconnects between various 
definitions of ‘multiculturalism’ as a theoretical 
discourse, multiculturalism on the ‘ground’ as a 
complex and differentiated ‘lived experience’, 
and most problematically, multiculturalism as 
operationalized through various social policies and 
practice. Supporters of ‘multiculturalism as a failed 
project’ have used specifically gendered crisis 
points such as ‘forced marriages’, female genital 
mutilation, ‘honour killings’, veiling (running the 
gamut of hijabs, jilbabs, burqas and niqabs), and 
concerns about the presence of Shari’ah law courts 
and alleged increases in polygamy, to sharpen 
their attack on Muslim communities and Islam as 
incompatible with human rights.
However, in assuming victimhood among Muslim 
women, some social welfare and family law policies 
and professionals are not only failing to help Muslim 
women access culturally appropriate needs-based 
services, but are also denying them access to the 
full positive potential of their Islamic rights, vilifying 
the Islamic frames of reference that many Muslim 
women rely on, and by means of which they are 
empowered.
Muslim women’s organizations have not hidden 
from confronting the difficult issues listed above, 
while also contending with a largely unsupportive 
Muslim male leadership that has monopolized 
access to policymakers and funders. Yet despite 
this, when opportunities have arisen to engage with 
Government and policymakers, there have been 
significant reasons for cynicism among many Muslim 
women’s organizations. The establishment of the 
National Muslim Women’s Advisory Group (NMWAG) 
in 2008 was initially publicized as supporting 
the empowerment of Muslim women in Britain, 
even though it was funded through PREVENT. It 
attracted widespread criticism from the outset with 
accusations that Muslim women were being used to 
‘spy’ on their families and communities, and that the 
group was not representative and therefore unable 
to deliver meaningful change at the grassroots level. 
Two-and-a-half years later, the group collapsed, after 
the public resignation of its Chair, Shaista Gohir, who 
accused NMWAG of being little more than a ‘tick box 
exercise’ and ‘not serious about the role of women in 
influencing public policy…’ (Gohir, 2010).
The prioritizing of PREVENT has caused a deflection 
of funding and resources away from areas that 
grassroots organizations, especially Muslim women’s 
groups, identify as significant – social welfare, health 
and educational projects, family relationships and 
marriage and divorce support. These organizations 
work within religious and cultural frames of reference 
supporting the most marginalized and inaccessible 
groups, and do so with scarce resources, being 
dependent largely on voluntary contributions. 
However, their Muslim identity has rested 
uneasily within social welfare-based definitions of 
multiculturalism, while austerity-led funding cuts 
are marginalizing an already marginalized Muslim 
voluntary sector.
To take a particular example – marital breakdown 
among British Muslims is on the increase, yet there 
is little formal support available, and even less 
interest on the part of Government, unless issues 
around polygamy or suspect ‘visa marriages’ are 
raised. Several studies highlight how Muslim women 
make up the majority of applicants to Shari’ah 
councils across Britain (Ahmad and Sheriff, 2001). 
They demonstrate the difficulties Muslim women face 
from secularized institutions such as social services, 
solicitors and the judiciary, who are often unable to 
offer faith-sensitive services or acknowledge the 
centrality of faith for their Muslim clients (Ahmad 
and Sheriff, 2001). Successive governments have 
failed to recognize the significance of this, influenced 
instead by media-led scare stories around the evils 
of Shari’ah law. The Muslim voluntary sector and 
Muslim women’s organizations, already poorly 
resourced, provide vital services supporting women 
through access to ‘female-friendly’ Shari’ah councils 
in order to obtain an Islamic divorce, or by providing 
faith-based counselling. The first Muslim women’s 
shelter, opened in October 2012, is funded through 
donations to the National Zakat Foundation, and 
is a direct response to the inadequacy of secular 
women’s shelters, indicating the significance of faith-
based service provision for many Muslim women 
(Bano, 2012).
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Conclusion: Ways Forward
There is a need for an urgent review around funding 
for voluntary and ethnic minority and faith groups, 
with less red tape and fewer complicated forms to 
comply with; more support for existing projects that 
are responding to localized needs; greater provision 
of free English classes, and greater support for 
grassroots projects on marriage, relationship and 
divorce support. In addition, research recently 
published shows that anti-Muslim sentiment is 
on the rise. ‘Tell MAMA’ – a helpline that reports 
Islamophobic incidents – has revealed that 58% of 
physical attacks reported within 12 months were 
on visibly Muslim women. They call for more police 
training and recording of Islamophobic attacks, but 
also a need for the Home Office to take greater 
responsibility in tackling far-right and ‘broadband 
extremism’ (Tell MAMA, 2013).
The current lack of needs-based funding for Muslim 
women’s organizations not only indicates a lack of 
sincerity on the part of successive governments in 
their claims to support Muslim women, but forces 
Muslim women’s organizations to work within 
restrictive frameworks that may not be best suited 
to the communities they serve. Ultimately, this 
‘agenda-led’ form of funding will only feed further 
scepticism.
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Introduction
This short paper presents 2001 and 2011 census 
data for the Muslim population in England and 
Wales to show:
• how it has grown;
• how it is distributed geographically;
• how its geography is changing;
• and that its residential separation is decreasing.
Census Religion Question
The census in England and Wales has asked a 
question on religion since 2001. The question, 
which is the only voluntary question on the census 
form, asks ‘What is your religion?’ and aims to 
determine affiliation rather than the degree of 
religiosity or practice (ONS, 2012a). There are 
seven pre-coded categories (no religion, Christian, 
Buddhist, Hindu, Jewish, Muslim and Sikh) to 
choose from as well as a write-in ‘other’ category. 
The categories are fully comparable between 2001 
and 2011 (ONS, 2012b). In 2011, however, the 
tick box for ‘no religion’ had changed from ‘none’ 
in 2001, which may have affected the number of 
people identifying with the category.
Growth in the Muslim 
Population, 2001–2011
In 2011, almost 5% of the population in England 
and Wales ticked Muslim as a religion, making it the 
second most popular after Christianity. The number 
of people identifying with a Muslim religion increased 
by almost 1.2m (or 75%), which is the biggest 
increase for any religious group since 2001 (see 
Table 1).
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Table 1. Religious affiliation, England and Wales, 2001–2011
Religious 
affiliation
2001 2011
N % N %
Christian 37,338,486 71.7 33,243,175 59.3
No religion 7,709,267 14.8 14,097,229 25.1
Religion not 
stated 4,010,658 7.7 4,038,032 7.2
Muslim 1,546,626 3.0 2,706,066 4.8
Hindu 552,420 1.1 816,633 1.5
Sikh 329,360 0.6 423,158 0.8
Jewish 259,928 0.5 263,346 0.5
Buddhist 144,453 0.3 247,743 0.4
Other religion 150,720 0.3 240,530 0.4
Source: 2011 Census (Crown Copyright) Table KS209EW.
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Geographical Concentration 
of the Muslim Population in 
2011
The Muslim population in England and Wales 
is clustered in selected Local Authorities (LA). 
In 2011 almost 35% of the population of Tower 
Hamlets, East London were Muslim. Moreover, 
more than one-fifth of the population identify 
themselves as Muslim in Newham, Blackburn 
with Darwen, Bradford, Luton, Redbridge, Slough, 
Waltham Forest and Birmingham (see Figure 
1). These places tend to be settlement areas for 
migrants from Southern Asia. There are also higher 
proportions of Muslims compared with the national 
average (4.8%) in many LAs that border these 
clustered areas (e.g. Barking and Dagenham, 
Pendle and Bolton).
Figure 1. Geographical distribution of the 
Muslim population, England and Wales, 
2011
Source: 2011 Census (Crown Copyright) 
Table KS209EW.
Change in Geography of 
the Muslim Population, 
2001–2011
The 2011 census reported that the proportion of 
the population with a Muslim religion had grown in 
all LAs in England and Wales, except for six where 
the Muslim population was assessed as lower than 
1000. The Muslim population grew at a faster rate 
in LAs outside of Inner London (83%) than in the 
LAs of Inner London (44%) during the 2000s.
Table 2 shows that in 2011 the rate of growth 
had been greatest in LAs with more than 1000 
Muslims, i.e. Barking and Dagenham (257%) and 
Solihull (221%). This is likely to reflect a process 
of residential dispersal away from clustered areas. 
The large absolute growth in the most clustered 
areas (e.g. Birmingham) will, in part, have been 
a consequence of the youthful population of 
the Muslim population growing through natural 
increase (more births than deaths) as well as new 
immigration (Peach, 2006).
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Table 2. Change in the Muslim Population, 2001–2011: Districts with biggest absolute and relative growth
District Change % Change
Districts with biggest absolute increase in Muslims:
Birmingham 94,378 67
Bradford 53,853 72
Manchester 43,690 122
Newham 39,163 66
Redbridge 36,512 128
Districts with biggest relative increase in Muslims (>1000 in 2011):
Gwynedd 1,041 309
Barking and Dagenham 18,372 257
Solihull 3,610 221
Norwich 1,725 194
Bristol 14,352 187
Source: 2011 Census (Crown Copyright) Table KS209EW.
Decrease in Muslim 
Segregation
The measurement of residential clustering is 
difficult. Though a growing number of an ethnic 
group in one place is a bigger ‘cluster’, it does 
not mean any greater separation from others. For 
example, in Inner London the Muslim population 
has grown in size, leading to larger clusters of 
Muslims in central parts of the capital. At the same 
time there has been a spreading out from the 
biggest Muslim concentrations (e.g. Tower Hamlets) 
towards neighbouring areas (e.g. Barking and 
Dagenham). The amount of residential separation 
can be measured using the Index of Dissimilarity, 
which compares the percentage of a group’s total 
population in England and Wales that lives in an 
LA with the percentage of the rest of the population 
living in that same LA. The absolute differences in 
percentage are added up across the 348 LAs of 
England and Wales, and then halved so that the 
Index is between 0 and 100 (Simpson, 2007).
The Muslim population is relatively evenly spread 
through England and Wales (Index of Dissimilarity 
of 54%), which means the separation factor has 
decreased since 2001 by 2 percentage points 
(see Figure 2). The only religious group to have 
increased its separation during the last decade is 
the relatively small Jewish population, which was 
the most separated (63%) of all religions in the 
2011 Census.
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Figure 2. Religion’s Spread across England and Wales, 2011
Source: 2011 Census (Crown Copyright) Table KS209EW.
Summary
Between 2001 and 2011 the Muslim population:
• grew by almost 1.2m to 2.7m, increasing its 
share of the population from 3% to 4.8%;
• is clustered in selected areas with a history 
of immigration from Southern Asia – Tower 
Hamlets, for example, where Muslims account 
for 35% of the population;
• is growing in areas where it is already most 
clustered, but at a faster rate in neighbouring 
areas (e.g. Barking and Dagenham and Solihull);
• was fairly evenly spread across England and 
Wales in 2001, and has become more so by 
2011.
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Introduction
For hundreds of years Muslim soldiers, 
sailors and more recently airmen have 
valiantly served, fought and died as part 
of the British Armed Forces. Hundreds of 
thousands volunteered to fight in both World 
Wars and today hundreds continue to serve 
in the British Armed Forces. (AFMA website)
In 2006 Jabron Hashmi, 24, became the first 
British Muslim soldier to die in Afghanistan. His 
older brother, Zeeshan, who had also worked in 
the British Army, said at the time: ‘Jabron was a 
committed soldier and a committed Muslim. He was 
fiercely proud of his Islamic background and he was 
equally proud of being British and was very proud 
to live in Britain.’
The death in service of this avowedly Muslim 
patriot was acknowledged as a significant event 
at the highest levels. The following year members 
of Hashmi’s family, who lived in Birmingham and 
were originally from Pakistan, were asked to lay 
the foundation stone for the new National Memorial 
Arboretum in Staffordshire. However, although 
Jabron’s death was commemorated as a form of 
sacrifice for the nation, it was perceived by many 
other Muslims as an act of betrayal.
In a BBC report entitled ‘UK’s Muslim Soldiers 
“fighting extremists not Muslims”’, Zeeshan Hashmi 
subsequently revealed that, following Jabron’s 
death, the family had received many letters from 
‘well-wishers of all faith and backgrounds’, which 
had been a great source of comfort. But they had 
also experienced hostility on the grounds that 
Jabron was considered a traitor.
These divergent responses help to illustrate why 
the figure of the Muslim performing military service 
is so significant. At one extreme, as a British soldier, 
Jabron Hashmi was hailed as a hero who gave 
his life for his country. For others, as a Muslim, he 
was accused of betraying his faith by fighting in a 
war that demonized Islam as the enemy of western 
civilization. Yet it is not often that we hear about the 
experience of minorities, particularly those who are 
Muslims, who decide to work in the armed forces.
Britain’s military institutions are regarded as 
separate from the rest of the public sector, to which 
they nominally belong. At the same time, they play 
a crucial role in mediating ideas about national 
identity, and about the relationship between the 
past and the present. The act of volunteering to 
be a soldier is thought to reach into the heart of 
what it means to ‘serve’ the nation. As a result, 
when greater attention is paid to the conditions of 
military service and the personal costs borne by the 
‘ordinary’ women and men involved, the presence 
(or absence) of ethnic, cultural, sexual and religious 
minorities presents itself as an index of inclusion 
within (or exclusion from) the wider society.
The most recent statistics published by the Ministry 
of Defence (MoD, 2012a) indicate that there are 650 
Muslims serving in the UK armed services. Of these, 
550 are in the British Army, constituting 0.5% of the 
total. In common with other faith groups, Muslim 
servicemen and women maintain a network of 
mutual support known as the Armed Forces Muslim 
Association (AFMA). So what does this organization 
tell us about the conditions of diversity in the army?
A Modern Multicultural 
Military?
Within the past decade the MoD has been able 
to claim that, in terms of numbers, the proportion 
of black and minority ethnic personnel in all three 
services has risen from just over 1% to more than 
7%. In the British Army, the figure currently hovers 
around 10%.
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This rise can partly be explained by the fact 
that residency regulations for Commonwealth 
citizens were dropped in 1998, partly in response 
to documented levels of racism and the virtual 
absence of diversity in the workforce. Today, two-
thirds of BME personnel are classified as ‘foreign 
and Commonwealth’, and this figure does not 
include Gurkhas who are recruited from Nepal 
(MoD, 2012b). The employment of soldiers from 
outside the UK has had a significant impact on 
the institution’s progress towards becoming a 
multicultural  (and multi-faith) employer. But this 
process of modernization has also been mandated 
by law.
In 2003 the religion and belief elements of the 
European Employment Framework Directive were 
incorporated into the UK Employment Equality 
Regulations. Two years later the appointment 
of Buddhist, Muslim, Sikh and Hindu chaplains 
replaced a system whereby religious leaders were 
engaged simply as advisers. For Muslims, as for 
other faith groups, this reform meant the possibility 
of a support network for individuals scattered 
across the institution.
Diversity as a Martial Asset
When Imam Asim Hafiz took up the post of first 
Muslim chaplain in 2005, it was unclear how many 
Muslims were serving, since comprehensive 
statistics were only collected from 2007. By 2009, 
there were 500 Muslims in the regular armed 
forces. Over 400 of these were in the army, and 
a significant proportion were citizens of countries 
such as The Gambia, Ghana, Nigeria and Pakistan. 
It was at this point that AFMA was set up with 
the licence to explore the wider issue of Muslims 
serving in the military.
In AFMA’s first newsletter, Imam Hafiz explained 
how the group hoped to persuade civilians of the 
significance of their work:
Unfortunately there is a huge … ignorance 
in some parts of the Muslim community and 
I hope that AFMA will be able to bridge the 
gap between the Armed Forces and the 
Muslim community and be a reminder that 
HM Forces are as integral to British society 
as are other British institutions such as the 
Police Force, the fire service and the NHS 
that are here to serve this nation as whole 
including the Muslim community. (Hafiz, 
2010: 7)
The Imam was supported by the Muslim Council 
of Britain (MCB) in his expressed aims to educate 
the Muslim community about the opportunities 
provided by military service. The MCB issued a 
report entitled Remembering the Brave: The Muslim 
Contribution to Britain’s Armed Forces, in which 
they confront the issue not just of ignorance about 
what it might mean to serve in the military, but also 
the depth of hostility towards the government’s 
foreign policy. The report asserts that ‘Loyalty does 
not mean the suspension of our critical faculties 
and failure to question our contested national 
engagements’ (MCB, n.d.).
In an oblique reference to documented war crimes, 
such as the murder in 2003 of civilian Baha Mousa 
by British soldiers in Iraq, the report ventures into 
more controversial territory: ‘We should ensure 
that the actions of a few do not diminish the overall 
expectations of our armed forces to abide by 
international laws of war and uphold fundamental 
human rights.’
While these arguments are addressed to UK 
citizens at home, the organization of Muslims 
inside the armed forces has been acknowledged by 
sections of the military leadership too. In 2009 the 
then Chief of the General Staff, General Sir David 
Richards, the first patron of the AFMA, commented 
publicly that Britain ‘had a commitment to … all 
those Muslims with whom we have a natural 
identity, given our own core values reflect very 
strongly those of Muslim faith’.1
The raised profile of Muslim personnel – including 
the Imam – has also been utilized as a strategic 
asset in Afghanistan. This could be seen in 
news reports emphasizing the participation of 
Muslims, whether joining forces with Afghan 
security personnel to celebrate Eid or acting as 
intermediaries with Afghan civilians.2 Seen in this 
Runnymede Perspectives22
light, the pragmatic tools of counter-insurgency 
warfare intersect with the symbolic aspects of 
soldiering on the domestic front.
The Conditions of Military 
Work
Because of Britain’s history as an aggressive 
imperial power, its military institutions play a critical 
role in making and reproducing official versions of 
Britishness. As the quote at the start of this piece 
indicates, the contribution of Muslim soldiers in 
Britain’s contemporary wars can be placed within a 
much longer record of service to the British Crown 
that stretches back over two centuries.
As we saw earlier, the increased presence 
of Muslims in the UK armed forces is a direct 
consequence of widening military recruitment to 
include citizens of Britain’s former colonies as 
well as the children of postcolonial migrants and 
settlers. Seen in this historical perspective, the 
significance of Muslim soldiers today – regardless 
of the actual numbers involved – indicates the 
symbolic importance of military work in the ongoing 
struggle for full citizenship and the right to belong in 
a diverse, multi-faith society.
Notes
1. In the same interview Richards also said: ‘It is 
very important for the Muslim community to be 
exposed to an alternative view as it is for the rest 
of the nation. The Taliban kill many more Muslims 
than we do.’
2. For example: On 16 November 2010 the 
Muslim chaplain gave a sermon to a multi-national 
congregation in the festival of Eid ul Adha in 
conjunction with the Imam of the local 205 Corps 
of the Afghan National Army (ANA). A lengthy 
report on the MoD’s Defence News site revealed 
that there were 600 Muslims present, including 
representatives from across ISAF military forces, 
defence contractors and civilian workers as well 
as ‘local Afghans’. The occasion was hailed as a 
reflection of ‘the united relationship’ between ISAF 
and the Afghan National Army (MoD, Defence 
News, 2012).
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Introduction
In the wake of the 2001 riots, a range of policy 
reports have focused attention on the public 
‘concerns’ over segregated communities in general, 
and of Muslim schools in particular. The political 
discourse surrounding segregation reached its peak 
following the publication of a number of studies on 
ethnic segregation in Britain’s state schools which 
were widely reported within the media. Subsequent 
public discourse established an unchallenged 
wisdom that associated ethnic clustering and 
group solidarity with ‘self-segregation’, social and 
economic marginalization and civil unrest. In light 
of this, community cohesion, integration and, for 
some, assimilation became the key paradigm in 
dealing with the Muslim question, with a particular 
focus on Muslim young men as constituting a 
‘problem’, most often read through the lens of 
educational underachievement, alienation and ‘the 
gang’ (Alexander, 2000).
This paper, drawing upon ethnographic data and 
focus group interviews with over 30 school pupils 
in the north of England, aims to demonstrate an 
alternative way of framing ethnic group identity. 
First, it questions the idea of Muslim group identity 
as essentially problematic, and aims to provide a 
positive way of framing group identity. Second, it 
demonstrates how, following the War on Terror, 
Muslim group solidarity or ‘asabiyya’, as understood 
through the works of Ibn Khaldun (d.1406), 
becomes a key mechanism for resisting anti-Muslim 
racism within schools. Finally, it aims to provide 
a critique to the dominant paradigm of ethnically 
mixed schools and provides possible ways forward. 
Group Identity as 
Problematic?
Within Britain’s dominant rhetoric of individualism, 
meritocracy and social mobility, group solidarity 
amongst young men is often treated with great 
suspicion, associated with hyper-masculinity and 
gang culture. The events of the 2001 riots, 9/11 and 
7/7 have come to frame Muslim group solidarity, 
in particular, through the same problematic lens. 
Government policies in the past decade have thus 
attempted to break up segregated schools in a 
number of the northern mill-towns of Britain. The 
logic behind such policies has been the assumption 
that segregation leads to social unrest or violent 
extremism, and that group solidarity and friendships 
amongst ethnic minority youth necessarily promote 
crime and violence (Miah, 2012).
In contrast to official concerns with group solidarity, 
discourses among Muslims tend to view group 
solidarity as a positive feature of any active society, 
maintaining that human beings are essentially 
social beings who live together and that their future 
is determined by the wider social bonds they create 
and nurture with their fellow humans. For ethnic 
minority young people in Britain, moreover, the 
importance of relying upon peer groups is often a 
fundamental element of protection, security and 
resistance, especially when there are perceived or 
real experiences of prejudice and abuse.
In the wake of the War on Terror and the growth 
of widespread anti-Muslim racism, these issues 
have been highlighted for young Muslims in 
the context of schooling in three ways. First, 
we have seen the discourse of integration and 
counter-terrorism shaping school policies and the 
pathologized framing of Muslim pupils through the 
implementation of certain strands of the Prevent 
policies in schools (Miah, 2012). Second, despite 
occasional success stories of ethnic minority 
achievement, racial inequality is so profoundly 
embedded in the educational system that some 
researchers are talking about ‘locked-in inequality’, 
i.e. a situation where the levels of inequality are so 
deep-seated that the removal of existing barriers 
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will not create a level playing-field (Gillborn, 2008). 
Finally, we have witnessed an increase in racist 
incidents within schools in the UK: in response to 
a Freedom of Information request, it was disclosed 
that 88,000 incidents of racist bullying were 
recorded in British schools between 2007 and 2011. 
Some areas, such as Oldham, Luton, Croydon and 
Middlesbrough, saw an increase of 40% or more 
over the period 2007/08 to 2009/10 (Talwar, 2012). 
In such a climate, issues of solidarity assume 
greater significance and demand recognition of the 
complex motivations underpinning group formation.
 
Group Solidarity and 
School Spaces
Clustering of members of the same ethnic group 
is an everyday and unremarkable feature of many 
schools in Britain. Indeed, one of the paradoxes 
of the ethnically mixed schools which were 
brought about through local authority intervention 
is the perpetuation of such clustering in the new 
setting – thus the cycle continues to repeat itself 
with segregation between schools giving way to 
segregation within schools, and with an ongoing 
focus on ethnic minority young men as constituting 
the primary ‘problem’ or barrier to cohesion. 
Nevertheless, Muslim group solidarity or ‘asabiyya’ 
in mixed schools demonstrates how resistance 
to anti-Muslim racism is one of its key functions, 
rather than the desire to maintain segregation per 
se. ‘Asabiyya’ becomes a way of resisting anti-
Muslim prejudice in the broader context of the War 
on Terror. This is clearly articulated by the following 
interviewee:
We go to a mainly white school, but all the 
Muslims and also the Asians hang together. 
You know it’s not because we don’t like white 
people or because we want to stick with our 
own. There is a more simple explanation 
– we have to be together to get through 
the day. There is pure racism after what’s 
happened with the war and what have you. 
So we hang together to [en]sure unity and 
strength. The teachers don’t watch our back 
we have to do it ourselves.
Muslim pupil group solidarity within the context of 
schooling can act as a potentially positive social 
force – it nurtures social bonding, with emphasis 
on fellowship, partnership and association. The 
function of group solidarity is thus to form unity 
consensus and provide direction. Within Muslim 
discourses – with for example the notion of 
asabiyya – ‘sticking together’ plays a pivotal role in 
constructing the idea of ‘Muslim Ummah’, which is 
then used as a source of strength.
Group solidarity can then be seen as playing 
an important role in achieving group protection, 
generating support and nurturing feelings of stability 
in a climate of hostility. It helps young Muslims to 
navigate their schooling experience, by providing a 
way of symbolizing strength through numbers, and 
signalling that racism and/or anti-Muslim prejudice 
will not be tolerated. Group solidarity thus becomes 
a performance enacted by Muslim pupils as a way 
of resisting and challenging hostility and violence – 
real or symbolic.
Conclusion
For Muslim pupils, in the aftermath of 9/11 and 
7/7, racist experiences are increasingly seen as 
a fact of everyday life or even a rite of passage 
that Muslim pupils inevitably have to undergo. Any 
debate on integration and segregation of schooling 
must first factor in experiences of anti-Muslim 
racism; second, recognize the importance of group 
solidarity as a mundane and potentially positive 
feature of school life; and finally, recognize and 
respond to the ways in which international and 
national events shape local Muslim spaces and 
experiences within schools.
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Introduction: Knowing 
Muslims
We are used to ‘knowing about’ Muslims 
through the prism of spectacular events. Visual 
representations combine with media discourses 
in which social and cultural categories – ethnicity, 
gender, class, nation – are conflated with religion 
to produce the figure of the Muslim or the ‘Muslim 
community’. Muslim lives are filtered through media 
technologies in other ways too. The ‘Arab Spring’, 
for example, recently celebrated the youthful, 
liberal and tech-savvy trajectory for Muslims in the 
Middle East (and beyond), turning them into poster-
children for the liberatory power of social media and 
technology.
On the one hand, media technologies play a key 
role in shaping dominant narratives about Muslims, 
while on the other they enable Muslims to exercise 
freedoms and forms of self-expression. However, 
this also reflects a polarized view of what or who 
Muslims are, either as passive subjects of tradition, 
‘community’ and religion (often epitomized by 
Sharia law) or as rebellious youth utilizing ‘western’ 
technologies (Facebook, Twitter etc) toward freer, 
yet uncertain, ends.
The social impact of media technologies 
goes beyond issues of representation and its 
individualized psychosocial effects. The different 
forms of use, content and institutions that are 
part of any media technology also play a role in 
its processes and the unfolding of its effects. This 
challenges the conventional link between Muslims, 
media and representation which most usually 
results in knowledge framed through broad social 
categories such as ‘community’. A closer look at 
the role of media technologies in everyday Muslim 
lives – here through the example of Unity FM, a 
self-proclaimed Muslim ‘community radio station’ 
in inner-city Birmingham – is insightful for the 
myriad ways that overarching categories such as 
‘community’, religion and authority are negotiated 
rather than determined. In this paper I discuss how 
a particular media technology – radio – operates as 
a site of simultaneous efforts to institutionalize ‘the 
Muslim community’ (largely by the management) 
and to challenge this (by certain presenters and 
listeners) resulting in the airwaves being a space 
of creative tension, where different people and 
viewpoints come together to make community and 
authority. By taking this approach, I illuminate a 
more complex relationship between Muslims, media 
technologies and popular representations.
Research on the Airwaves
As part of recent ethnographic research in 
Sparkbrook, Birmingham I participated in the life 
of a number of cultural spaces where Muslims 
(and sometimes non-Muslims) come together for 
different ends. One of these, Unity FM, occupies 
part of the first floor of an imposing listed Victorian 
building, which was previously the Centre for 
Multicultural Education. Around 2004 the building 
was acquired by some local Yemenis and has 
since operated as a commercial venture providing 
local businesses and charities with cheap office 
space as well as regular ‘community’ events. The 
space offers itself as a local hub for a wide range 
of Muslim ventures across different age groups, 
genders and ethnicities.
Unity FM is probably the longest-standing and 
busiest tenant in the building. The radio station’s 
claim to not only serve the Birmingham Muslim 
community, but also to embody it, is a key source 
of its perceived legitimacy and success. The 
station claims to represent the demographic fact of 
Muslims in Birmingham through its programming, 
recruitment of volunteers and signal reception. One 
of the station’s key aims is to serve the community 
through a carefully designed programme of 
shows that impart information to Muslims. There 
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is an element of reflexivity built into this through 
talk shows and call-ins, and an expectation that 
listeners and hosts respect Unity FMs uniqueness, 
impact and ethos by keeping it on air. This 
generally means that nothing is said or done that 
will jeopardize Unity FM’s licence to broadcast.
During my time as a volunteer at Unity FM I 
observed how ‘community’ was regularly nurtured 
through careful management of programme 
content, presenters and listeners’ call-ins. What 
also became apparent to me was how the station’s 
authority and ability to do this was also regularly 
challenged and negotiated by a number of 
presenters and volunteers as part of their attempts 
to cultivate a broader sense of community.
One such case was Habib, a success at Unity 
FM, as was evident from his 5-year tenure at the 
station. But he was also controversial. Habib’s time 
at Unity FM was characterized by regular tussles 
with listeners and management over the types 
of music that were considered acceptable to the 
‘Muslim community’. There were different gendered 
and racial connotations carried in certain musics 
that exposed tensions between cultural perceptions 
and religious convictions among Unity FM’s 
listenership. To challenge what he saw as reductive 
ideas about music that were constricting the space 
of community, Habib carefully utilized religiously 
inflected sources of information, including texts, 
listeners and artists, to challenge what he saw 
as gendered and ethnic bias among listeners 
and management. He gradually broadened the 
station’s position on music. He urged reflection 
on the message inherent in the music he played 
rather than on the vocal performer (male/female) or 
genres (hip-hop, reggae, etc.) which had previously 
led people to draw boundaries around the types 
of music that could be put out through Unity FM’s 
airwaves.
Habib was credited with helping to create space for 
more alternative voices to take to the airwaves at 
Unity FM. This included women’s voices, women 
like Alima who is a current favourite with a Thursday 
night show entitled Inner Conflicts. Alima’s self-
professed style is akin to that of an American 
self-help management guru. A key feature of her 
show is her innovative use of content from self-help 
manuals, cross-referenced with Islamic references 
and broadcast with the use of emotive language 
to cultivate positive predispositions in listeners. 
She uses the radio waves to present herself as 
‘authoritative’ and ‘respectable’ – her shows are 
replete with Quranic references and folklore iterated 
through a crisp, adopted Arabic dialect. Alima is 
celebrated by the management and listeners alike 
for provoking thinking and affect in the ‘community’ 
of listeners, and thereby broadening the ‘Muslim 
community’ through the appeal of her new 
globalized content and style, as well as providing a 
platform for new gendered identities.
Conclusion: On the Same 
Wavelength
The case of Unity FM, an almost invisible space 
in the otherwise conspicuous ‘Muslim community’ 
of inner-city Birmingham, reveals the complex 
ways in which designs for ‘community’ are 
created, countered and (re)constructed. Through 
this wavelength, diverse peoples, voices and 
messages come into close contact and in doing 
so destabilize limited notions of community. Each 
presenter brings with them not only new content 
to add to the tapestry of ‘the community’, but also 
new styles, messages and modes of engagement. 
The wavelength at Unity FM thus extends the 
possibilities for belonging to a larger project of 
‘Muslim community’: one not necessarily bound 
by the rules and authority of the station, nor 
seeking to subvert or replace it. Instead, disparate 
voices come together, on the same wavelength, 
in a coordinated yet unscripted way to create an 
expanded sense of being Muslim.
Runnymede Perspectives28
Introduction: The ‘Problem’ 
of Muslim Youth
In the current context of austerity and growing social 
unrest, discourses around ‘failed multiculturalism’ 
and ‘the problem of working-class youths’ have 
gained amplified significance through the image of 
‘the gang’ (Alexander, 2008). David Cameron’s 2011 
pledge to turn around the lives of 120,000 ‘troubled 
families’ marked the beginning of a Home Office 
commitment which aimed to identify and manage 
the areas most ‘at risk’ of gang and youth violence, 
to tackle the ‘scourge of gang culture’ (Home Office, 
2011). Practically speaking, the response has been 
increasingly based around funding intervention 
strategies that target those supposedly ‘at risk’ 
of becoming involved in ‘antisocial behaviour’, 
promoting increased levels of surveillance and 
policing.
The racialized nature of the political discourse 
surrounding this response has situated young, 
working-class Black and South Asian men within a 
longstanding nexus of ‘risk’. In the past two decades, 
this has been clearly articulated with contemporary 
media representations of young Muslim men as 
potential terrorists, groomers or gang members, an 
image perpetuated in the ongoing criminalization of 
Asian men. For example, in 2009–10 ‘Asian people 
were Stopped and Searched 2.2 times more than 
White people’ (Ministry of Justice, 2010). This paper 
critically engages with the contemporary discourse 
that portrays Muslim youths as somehow posing 
risks. It does so by reflecting upon the ways in which 
a small sample of Somali males (11–19 years of age) 
experienced and negotiated risk in their everyday 
lives. Specifically, inconsistencies between the ways 
in which this group were labeled as posing risk and 
the more mundane realties of their strategies of 
avoiding risk are illustrated.
The findings presented in this paper are taken 
from the results of a 3-year ethnographic research 
project. This research took place within three youth 
clubs and a homework club in two disadvantaged 
areas of a postindustrial northern city. Against the 
backdrop of these youth services, the research 
documents the ways in which youth workers and 
Somali young people negotiated the issue of 
risk labeling in their daily lives. This sample is of 
particular interest because, despite the established 
nature of the UK’s Somali population, Somalis 
remain a part of the British Muslim community 
about which very little is known. Significantly, for the 
young Somalis involved in this research, their ‘risk 
status’ integrally informed the way they identified 
with each other and expected others to identify with 
them.
Somali ‘Gangs’ and 
Preventative Intervention
The areas where this research took place were 
locally stigmatized for the presence of Somali ‘gangs’. 
They were also politically designated as ‘high risk’, 
and subjected to Home Office visits that aimed to 
develop discourses between youth workers, local 
residents and policymakers, with the aim of tackling 
this perceived problem. Whilst this governmental 
attention provided some opportunity for youth service 
funding, that funding contributed to the stigmatization 
of the areas in which they lived, because in order 
to get hold of such funding service organizers had 
to adopt language that played into the association 
of their areas with ‘risk’ (Alexander, 2008). To 
successfully obtain funding therefore logically 
contributed to the political recognition of these areas 
as needing ‘risk intervention’ due to the ‘problem’ of 
Somali youths. This was a situation the young people 
involved in this research were both aware of and 
occasionally utilized, through claiming reputations 
based on these self-same associations with risk.
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Expressive Masculinity and 
‘Risk Talk’
Expressions of masculinity played an integral role in 
the way that the male respondents in this research 
identified with each other. Amongst their peers, 
the negotiation of inclusion and respect was often 
managed through the presentation of a particularly 
stylized ‘hard’ masculinity. More often than not, 
this was displayed through the articulation of ‘risk 
talk’, which played with stereotypes of racialized 
masculinity and violence (as suggested by the title 
of this piece, taken from an interview with one of 
the young men). The following extract, taken from 
one of the focus groups, presents a characteristic 
example of this kind of talk:
Halimo: You get me? [Halimo adopts a 
comedic voice] We run the area. We no 
joking about. If bang bang comes, Killa, what 
do we do with the gun?
Killa: Bang bang bang bang bang!
In the absence of legitimate leisure opportunities, 
the young people’s expressions of this particular 
masculinity constituted an accessible medium 
through which they could acquire social status. It 
was also this absence of opportunity that framed 
the young people’s propensity to create excitement 
out of engaging, or at least talking about engaging, 
in behaviours like fighting or drug dealing. 
Unfortunately, however, it was often the case that 
the product of these expressions only confirmed 
the young people’s ‘risk status’ in the eyes of the 
local authorities, a status that was intrinsically 
linked to their religious, racial, geographic and class 
positioning.
Avoiding Risk
Tellingly, it was often from within the safety of the 
youth services that the young people developed 
their social standing through performing masculinity 
and ‘risk’. Indeed, it was specifically the safety 
provided by these controlled environments that 
made them so popular amongst service users:
Will: Why do you come to the youth club?
Halimo: We just come to stay out of trouble.
Will: So if the youth club wasn’t on do you 
think you’d be getting in more trouble then?
Shirwaz: Yep.
What these comments illustrate is a conscious 
desire on behalf of the young men to avoid or 
minimize risk. This contradiction, between the 
respondents’ performance and the avoidance of 
risk, was clearly illustrated through the popularity 
of the local homework club. This club ran twice 
a week, was voluntarily attended and was 
consistently oversubscribed. Many of the boisterous 
young Somali men who attended the youth clubs 
could also be found at the homework club. In fact, 
the almost exclusively Somali user group within 
this homework club reflected a solid emphasis on 
academic attainment that wholly contradicted the 
aforementioned discourses positioning working-
class Muslim youths within a nexus of ‘crisis’ and 
‘risk’. What this suggests is that the young people 
involved in this research adopted a ‘rational’ 
calculation of risk that was highly contextual. Put 
simply, although the expression and performance 
of ‘risk’ played an important part in the ways these 
young people presented themselves, the youth 
services provided a well-utilized opportunity to 
manage risk, ‘stay out of trouble’ and do homework.
Conclusion
Overall the findings of this research critically 
engage with the contemporary discourse that paints 
a homogeneous picture of working-class, Muslim 
youths as threat (Alexander, 2000), and points 
to broader continuities around race, class and 
gender. Significantly, it is the fact that these issues 
are not specific to Muslim boys that unsettles the 
dominant discourses portraying young Muslims as 
distinctively ‘separate’ from the wider British non-
Muslim population.
Of additional significance is the consistency of 
these research findings with existing studies that 
point towards the damaging nature of contemporary 
‘risk prevention’ agendas. Clearly, for the young 
people in this research the youth provision was 
significant in providing a space to avoid risk. Yet, 
the contemporary political framing of these services 
contributed to the young people’s recognition 
of stigma along the lines of ‘risk’, race, religion 
and class. This suggests that the youth services 
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served a clear purpose, but that the functionality 
of that purpose was challenged by funding 
agendas. In order for these spaces to continue to 
effectively provide a safe and secure environment 
for marginalized young people, a move away 
from negatively loaded ‘risk prevention’ agendas 
will be necessary. This will require an increased 
recognition, at policy level, of the stigmatizing 
impact of risk prevention agendas and the effect 
they can have on the everyday lives and identities 
of disadvantaged minority youths.
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Introduction
Diary Entry, 21 June 2012
I’m picking someone up from their work and waiting 
in my car. I see a white Subaru Legacy estate crawl 
past me. It’s a late nineties model but it’s in very 
good nick. More than that, it looks like someone’s 
spent a lot of money on customizing/modifying it: 
Arctic/Polar/Brilliant white paint job with colour-
coded bumpers, wing mirrors, front and rear spoiler 
and black tinted-out windows. Deep dish, black 
gloss-finished alloy wheels and thin, low-profile 
tyres. Small number plate on the back suggests 
it’s an import… probably has a 2.0 or 2.5 engine 
with a huge turbo adding more horses than seem 
possible; same sort of performance as the Ferrari 
beating Imprezzas… I should get out and introduce 
myself to the driver and tell him about my interest 
and research in cars and car culture… I imagine 
he’s some young kid, maybe early twenties, all 
tracky bottoms and Rockport boots, tramlines in his 
hair and a bit of bling on his hands. Not a thug, but 
probably sees himself as a bit bad-arse, him having 
such a bad-arse ride. I get out of my car and start to 
walk over, rehearsing an introduction, apologising 
for intruding on his time, but then stop and stare. 
The driver’s door of the Subaru opens and out 
steps a figure in black. For a second I can’t believe 
what I’m seeing. It’s a woman in a burqa and she 
opens the boot and pulls out a pram. This doesn’t 
seem right. A woman? Never mind a woman, a 
Sister? She does not fit the profile and I tell myself 
it’s not her car, but her brother’s or her husband’s. 
There is no other explanation.
Automatic Transmission: 
Ethnicity, Stereotypes and 
Cars in a Northern City
The car is a symbolic presence at the heart of the 
everyday experience of multi-ethnic coexistence. 
Exploring the potential significance of car 
ownership among members of the Pakistani/Muslim 
population in Bradford has an inherent interest and 
virtue, but more acutely, it can shed light on social 
relations where class, gender, religion and ethnicity 
intersect. The ‘young Asian/White/Muslim/Black 
male driver’ has acquired a certain meaning and 
reputation which has largely negative associations 
across Britain. However, once stereotypes such 
as the ones at play in the diary entry above are 
unpicked and engaged with, meaning becomes 
more nuanced and complicated, but no less vital. 
Indeed, the research upon which this paper is 
based suggests that car culture offers insights: 
first, into how some aspects of broader ‘British 
Muslim’ identity are framed; and second, that often 
negative, exoticized and racialized aspects of 
identity can be detuned and thus made less potent 
markers of racialized thinking.
Alongside its passengers, the car carries a range 
of other connotations tied with class, gender, 
generation and, powerfully and complexly, with 
ethnicity. The car has a myriad of layered meaning 
above and beyond the scope of transport and 
mobility. Indeed, over the decades, it has become 
even more acutely tied into the realm of popular 
culture and consumption and is therefore, certainly 
today, a powerful symbol which can both flatten 
and homogenize identity, on the one hand, while 
allowing identity to become interwoven with very 
sophisticated levels of nuance and individuation 
on the other. For example, while ‘Mondeo Man’ 
became shorthand for Mister Average, the world 
of car customization, tuning and enhancement can 
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inscribe the same vehicle with distinctive, personal 
aesthetics and contemporary forms of working-
class artisanship and creativity.
Within my previous ethnographically grounded 
research with young Bradfordian Pakistani Muslim 
men (Alam, 2006; Alam and Husband, 2006), 
a regular feature was the significance of and 
meanings associated with cars/car ownership. For 
some of the participants, a ‘nice’ car was important 
not only as a symbol of personal economic 
success, but as a means of expressing identity: 
car manufacturer, model and the presence of after-
market modifications resulted in either a high- or 
low-value commodity as defined by an ‘imagined’ 
community of drivers with its attendant, but fluid, 
tastes and preferences. In more recent research 
(Husband et al., forthcoming), several of those who 
prided themselves on modifying their vehicles, and 
in some cases owning unadulterated prestige or 
sports vehicles, were aware that the nature/look/
sound of their car attracts particular attention from 
members of the local community or the police. 
Often, such car owners are conscious of the risks: 
of being labeled as or perceived to be corrupt or 
criminal. As one respondent, S.J. (a 30-something 
businessman), stated: 
In Bradford, it (the Range Rover model) does 
have that gangster image so a few people 
have said to me ‘Why you driving a gangster 
car for? You should have a respectable 
car.’ I mean, what is a respectable car? The 
gangsters have them all! Everything what 
you drive in Bradford, above a certain price 
tag, it’s a gangster car.
Meanings and connotations weaving both class 
and ethnicity can be seen within the ‘motoscape’ 
of a multicultural city such as Bradford. At a very 
fundamental level, this can be interpreted to be a 
repetition of the oft-cited claim that cars can both 
carry and project high or low status. Because there 
are associations between a place and its wealth, 
its residents and their income, as well as ethnicities 
and ‘behaviours’/’cultures’, it is arguably convenient 
to make mental shortcuts that end up becoming 
established routes to understanding. Once existing 
racial codes and thinking are internalized in 
such ways, the race thinking narrative becomes 
normative and therefore all the more difficult to 
overcome.
However, cars offer much richer and vibrant forms 
of data which connect with issues linked with the 
realms of economy, employment and identity; as 
well as aspiration, leisure, conflict and art, and with 
a range of human emotions which the car facilitates 
and conveys: data drawn from individual car owners 
provides texture and depth, allowing our insights 
to become more nuanced and grounded and less 
prone to drawing, for example, racist conclusions. 
The car, and car culture, allows us to explore not 
only how and where patterns of racialized discourse 
take place, but also to deconstruct, resist and, 
ultimately, to allow processes of deracialization to 
become normative and everyday. To that end, what 
may seem to be a nerdish interest in car culture 
yields deeper exploration and understanding of 
identity and diversity at an historical moment where 
such facets of human life – for academic, policy 
and public discourse – appear to have become less 
important than fixations with extremism, fear and 
insecurity.
Conclusion
Diary Entry, 12 September 2012
As I fill my car, a red Mitsubishi GTO pulls up in the 
next bay. It’s a stunning car, looks like it’s just been 
washed and maybe even detailed. It’s low to the 
ground and the large, black wheels give it almost 
an unreal, impressionistic feel on the eye. It’s ten 
plus years old but it still looks good; all curves and 
scoops and bulges. A young Asian, Pakistani I’m 
predisposed to assuming given where we are and 
what I know about these sorts of cars, gets out to 
refuel.
I wait in the queue to pay and the driver of the 
GTO stands behind me. I keep stealing a look at 
his car and keeping thinking about turning around 
and speaking to him, getting a foot in, introducing 
myself and asking him about his car. But I feel like 
a whore because I’ve doing a lot of that, lately and 
it kind of gets wearing after a while. But… these 
cars, they don’t come along every day so eventually 
I do the usual introduction and he seems genuinely 
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interested in what I’m saying. We move our cars out 
of the bays and continue our conversation which 
includes some mention of stereotypes: You know, 
some cars seem have different meanings when 
certain types of people are in the driving seat. He 
asks me to elaborate. Well, some people might 
think that a young guy like you wouldn’t be able to 
afford to run a car like this. I mean, you’re how old? 
Twenty-seven, he tells me. You’re twenty-seven, 
you’re from Bradford and you’re Asian or Pakistani 
and you’re driving a three-litre sports car? How 
does he afford that? So people jump to conclusions 
about what you do. Maybe he deals drugs or 
something else a bit dodgy. You know how it is, 
right? He knows what I mean and we make some 
more talk about some of the hassle he gets from 
people about his choice of car, and the fact that he 
loves his cars, especially Honda CRXs. But then he 
puts me on the spot: What do you think I do for a 
living? Now me, not being one to make judgements 
or be stereotypical in my process, I’m keen not to 
commit. But he presses me. So I tell him. Well, 
I don’t really know but if I had to guess, I’d say 
maybe you work in an office, maybe in a factory or 
warehouse or something? I exaggerate the upward 
inflection at the end of the sentence so I sound 
like some California Valley school girl just to make 
sure he knows this is not me saying this. He smiles 
and then hits me with: I’m a Consultant. I work at 
LGI [Leeds General Infirmary]. Fuck. Who’d have 
thought? I mean, seriously.
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Introduction
The 15 million people of Muslim descent now 
settled in Western Europe represent the most 
significant movement of labour into the continent 
since the Second World War. Representing 
a wide range of nationalities, with their own 
particular cultures and histories of migration and 
settlement, they maintain diverse connections to 
their homelands old and new. Increasingly, many 
have been born and brought up in Europe and 
inhabit complex hybrid identities, as well as making 
citizenship-based claims for equality and respect. 
Nevertheless, amongst such groups, a growing 
consciousness of an overarching ‘Islamic’ identity 
has been growing in recent years. Its focus is 
feelings of belonging to, and participation in, a one-
billion-strong Muslim community (umma) worldwide. 
Suggesting that the frame of a ‘Muslim diaspora’ 
complements the study of Muslim Britain at local 
and national scales, this brief essay critically 
explores the emergence of trans-national Islamic 
consciousness in the UK since the 1960s and 
1970s.
Defining ‘the Muslim 
Diaspora’
The last two decades have seen notions of 
diaspora and transnationalism become extremely 
fashionable in scholarly and political discourse. 
To some extent, these concepts revisit traditional 
issues in the study of migration and minorities, 
race and ethnicity, which explore processes of 
movement and settlement. However, the classic 
definitions of diaspora relate it to a group’s 
consciousness of, and connection to, places and 
people elsewhere, whether in terms of a homeland 
or other historic centres of dispersal. While there is 
a danger that an emphasis on ‘diaspora’ constantly 
returns analyses to a question of roots in the 
past rather than routes in the present, the shift in 
terminology does recognize that many people’s 
contemporary lived experiences can no longer be 
seen as contained by the nation-state. Indeed, 
while diasporas have often succeeded in remaking 
‘homes’ abroad, some theorists have pointed to 
the significance of the metaphorical spaces ‘in-
between’ old and new homelands for imagining 
alternative forms of belonging. Symbolically 
and ritually connecting Muslims through time 
and across space, the idea of a transnational 
umma is especially well resourced to suggest 
a consciousness of community which need not 
conflict with being at home in particular locales 
but does shape people’s orientations to the past, 
present and future. However, perhaps especially 
when attachment to the old country has faded, 
and/or in the face of present exclusion, it does 
retain the potential to transcend place and envision 
alternative moral and political orders.
The Limits of Diaspora
Nevertheless, it is important to recognize the limits 
as well as the possibilities of a diasporic Muslim 
identity: in Britain, for example, there are two other 
scales that routinely shape the configuration of 
Islam.
First, Islam is most immediately tangible at 
the scale of the neighbourhood and most 
especially in terms of Muslim institutions such as 
mosques. While ritual gatherings have enabled 
congregations to affirm and transmit homeland 
beliefs and practices since the 1950s and 1960s, 
such institutions have also had to adapt to new 
local environments, cooperating when necessary 
across various religious and ethnic divisions, 
and especially when presenting a public face to 
outsiders. However, mosques have also been a 
location for struggles over status and power, as well 
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as instruments of exclusion, particularly in relation 
to women and young people.
Second, the secular state and its public institutions 
have profoundly shaped the dynamics of being 
Muslim in Britain. Approaches to the recognition 
and regulation of Muslims as ‘Muslims’, have 
been configured very differently over time, with 
the claims of religious leaders accommodated by 
some local councils during the 1980s, long before 
there was national-level legal protection of citizens 
against religious (as opposed to racial or ethnic) 
discrimination. However, with the UK government 
perceiving the nation-state to be simultaneously 
threatened by crises of cohesion and security 
following riots in 2001 and the events of ‘7/7’, the 
Preventing Violent Extremism agenda of the late 
2000s has unambiguously marked a clear shift in 
the state’s gaze from ‘race’ to ‘faith’ to ‘Muslims’. 
The Muslim Diaspora in 
Context
The significance of more transnational Islamic 
networks, activism and imaginaries in the UK can 
only be understood in dynamic relationship to 
these local and national scales. However, as the 
Iranian revolution of 1979, and the Arab Spring 
more recently, demonstrated so iconically, in the 
late-modern Muslim world Islamic revivalism has 
become central to articulating young people’s 
hopes for better futures across borders as well 
as within them. Of course, nascent British Muslim 
diasporas were not isolated from such global 
processes even in the 1960s and 1970s. Indeed, 
South Asian origin Islamic movements, such as 
Jama’at-i Islami, had a small but well-organized 
following in the UK amongst mainly urban origin 
migrants (often students and professionals) from 
this period. However, for demographic reasons, 
it was not until the 1980s and 1990s that their 
discourses impacted on British-born Muslims. 
Amongst educated segments of the second and 
third generations, a significant minority embraced 
the idea of following a universalizing ‘true’ Islam 
as a strategy of self-identification. In so doing, a 
multi-ethnic, Islamized modernity now articulated in 
an English-language vernacular, was distinguished 
from the ethno-cultural homeland Islam of their 
parents and the mosques.
In many ways, this began to mark the end of 
diaspora as ethno-national affiliation. It also helped 
many map out clear boundaries for behaviour, 
in (con)testing Western contexts of cultural 
pluralization and consumer capitalism. Even 
amongst those who were not pious or educated, 
feeling blocked out of Britain and rarely feeling at 
home when visiting the subcontinent, the idea of 
Islamic identity (if not practice) was in some way 
appealing.
From Diasporic Politics to 
Everyday Transnationalism
While the idea of the umma has a clear historical 
and territorial orientation in terms of Mecca, the 
birthplace of Islam and its Prophet, like their 
co-religionists overseas, some British Muslims 
have responded to various international conflicts 
and injustices in the postcolonial Islamic world 
by producing a more de-territorialized ummatic 
discourse calling for unity and self-reliant action 
amongst Muslims as a victimized community of 
suffering.
In Britain, the era of a diasporic Muslim identity 
politics was first catalysed during the Rushdie 
Affair of 1989, followed by the Gulf and Bosnian 
wars of the early to mid-1990s, the on-going 
situation in Palestine and Kashmir, and the  ‘war 
on terror’ in Afghanistan and Iraq following ‘9/11’. 
All have triggered heartfelt feelings of Islamic 
co-responsibility towards Muslim peoples and 
places elsewhere. For a very small number, more 
widespread conspiracy theories and utopian 
dreaming have been translated into trans-local 
action, including taking up arms overseas or at 
home. However, the predicament of Muslims across 
the diaspora has more often resulted in charitable 
giving, as well as peaceful protest and productive 
participation in a burgeoning British Muslim 
civil society. Moreover, for a growing number of 
Muslims in the UK, cosmopolitan connections to the 
wider Muslim world are becoming part of a more 
everyday transnationalism, whether in terms of 
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media consumption, seeking education, fashion or 
travelling for religious tourism.
Conclusion
It is apparent, then, that the dynamics of Muslim 
Britain must be understood at a combination of 
local, national and transnational scales. It is also 
important to recognize that at each of these scales, 
powerful notions of what counts as Islam tend 
to get imposed as the norm. In contrast, more 
‘demotic’ or everyday lived experiences of being 
Muslim in the home, the street or elsewhere have 
been marginalized in research as much as in public 
policy. So, while in the past policymakers and 
researchers overlooked the significance of religion, 
it is common now for formal and institutional 
constructions of religion to be overplayed. Indeed, 
the way that both government and Islamic leaders 
can view ‘Muslim’ identities as relatively fixed can 
be mutually reinforcing. Another consequence is 
that the fuzziness of everyday improvisations of 
‘doing’ religion can become obscured, with hard 
boundaries always assumed between ‘religion’ 
and ‘culture’ and ‘religion’ and the ‘secular’. What 
is required instead is an account which locates 
the multiple and often competing ways in which 
Islam is, or is not, narrated and performed in 
specific, structurally constrained contexts. Such an 
agenda will properly refocus attention on differently 
positioned embodied subjects and the reasons why 
they do, or do not, identify as Muslims, at specific 
intersections of class, gender, ethnicity, generation 
and sexuality.
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Introduction
Since 5 February 2013, Shahbag intersection 
in central Dhaka has been occupied by tens of 
thousands of Bangladeshis demanding justice for 
war crimes. The occupation has been taking place 
in the context of an ‘International Crimes Tribunal’, 
set up by the ruling Awami League in 2010, to 
investigate crimes committed by Islamist politicians 
during the Liberation war of 1971. At its peak it 
is thought to have involved as many as 500,000 
protesters (Anam, 2013) and the area was quickly 
dubbed Shahbag Square, prompting what some are 
calling ‘the Bangladesh Spring’ – the biggest mass 
protests the country has witnessed in 20 years.
However, on 28 February the demonstrations 
turned violent after Delwar Hossain Sayeedi, vice-
president of Jamaat-i-Islami, the country’s largest 
Islamic party, was sentenced to death. Jubilation in 
Shahbag Square was quickly followed by violence 
between Jamaat supporters and the police, and 
almost 100 people have been killed in clashes 
which have swept the country since. Commentators 
in the UK1 have highlighted the grief and anger the 
tribunal has stirred, particularly among the younger 
generation (Shukla, 2013). They have reported on 
the powerful sense of national pride and collective 
possibility that Shahbag reveals (Anam, 2013), 
as well as the intractable political gulf the recent 
bloodshed underscores (Al-Mahmood, 2013). 
However, few have considered what this political 
crisis on the other side of the world means here 
in the UK, and what it might tell us about Muslim 
identities in contemporary Britain.
From Shahbag Intersection 
to Tower Hamlets
Conflict between the secular nationalist spirit 
of Shahbag and supporters of Jamaat came to 
London on 9 February 2013. Local followers of the 
uprising demonstrated in Altab Ali Park in London’s 
East End. Protesters were met by Jamaatis, stones 
were thrown, but the protest continued undeterred 
(Cohen, 2013), an encounter which demonstrates 
that in the UK, as in Bangladesh, the Liberation 
War continues to be fought over in the present 
(Alexander, 2013). The relationship between 
Bengali organizations in the UK concerned with 
finding and prosecuting ‘war criminals’ from 1971 
(such as the Nirmal Committee) and more Islamist-
inspired groups are known to be strained, and these 
tensions have implications for the new generation 
of young politically engaged British Muslims (Eade 
and Garbin, 2006). But little is known about how 
relations between these groups form the basis for 
identities and claims-making in the UK, and even 
less about how relations between these groups 
may work their way into the contemporary spaces 
of British Muslim politics.
Taking these questions seriously requires us to 
historicize debates around South Asian Muslims in 
the UK, and challenges the homogenizing terms 
of those debates. Constructed as the privileged 
site of ‘community’ and static immutable ‘tradition’, 
South Asian Muslims in the UK have been most 
usually defined through cultural absolutes located 
outside the political process or history. But this 
representation is quickly unsettled by history itself; 
revealing the complicated trajectories of social and 
political engagement that position Muslims in very 
different ways. Exploring ‘intra-minority’ identity 
disrupts monological assertions of ‘difference’ 
with insights into the multi-layered and contested 
dimensions of diasporic space. Here, the position 
of Urdu-speaking ‘Biharis’ in Bangladesh is a case 
in point, and one that raises important issues for 
Muslim identities in Britain.
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Contesting Community 
and Citizenship: Intra-
minority Muslim Identities in 
Bangladesh
Originating in Northern and Eastern India, the 
‘Urdu-speaking Bihari2 community’ were first 
displaced in the Indian Partition of 1947, before 
Bangladesh’s War of Liberation in 1971 displaced 
many for a second time. It is thought that around 
three million Bengalis lost their lives in the 
Liberation struggle, and the new country was left 
profoundly traumatized. Following the 1971 war, 
the entire ‘Bihari’ community were branded enemy 
collaborators and socially ostracized. Some fled 
overseas, particularly to the US, Pakistan and the 
UK, while others, having been dispossessed by 
the state, found themselves in temporary camps 
set up nationwide. For 36 years those living in the 
camps were recognized as a ‘de facto stateless’ 
community by UNHCR. In May 2008, they 
regained their citizenship in a High Court Ruling 
thought to have finally turned the situation on its 
head; however, their uncertain status has been 
highlighted yet again in the current political turmoil.
My previous research (Redclift, 2013) has 
compared the trajectories of those displaced into 
camps with those who had been able to retain 
their homes during the 1971 war, examining the 
precarious nature of claims to rights before and 
after the transition to formal citizenship. The 
research involved semi-structured and narrative 
interviews, documentary analysis, focus groups and 
participant observation conducted between 2006 
and 2009, and it developed the concept of ‘political 
space’ to capture the way in which identity and 
citizenship are structured in space, over time, and 
through social position. It argued that citizenship 
is not a stable identity of law and fact but a shifting 
assortment of exceptions, rejections, inclusions and 
denials, and the concept of ‘political space’ is better 
equipped to deal with the inequalities of ‘race’, 
ethnicity, age, class, space and gender hidden 
behind citizenship’s beneficent facade. ‘Political 
space’ better reflects the fractious, contested and 
constantly evolving nature of political identity, which 
can clearly be seen in Bangladesh today, and it 
opens up debate about the role of transnational 
political engagement in shaping claims to future 
belonging in the UK.
Transnational Political Space 
in the UK
New research develops this analysis by applying 
it to those ‘Urdu-speakers’ who left Bangladesh 
in 1971 and established themselves in Britain. As 
Muslims of Indian origin they were labelled ‘Biharis’ 
in East Pakistan and became known as ‘Stranded 
Pakistanis’ following the Liberation War. However, 
their links with the Indian, Pakistani or Bengali 
communities in the UK are unknown. It investigates 
the extent to which ‘Urdu-speakers’ experience 
and perform their identity differently in different 
settings and the extent to which issues of gender, 
generation, class and space inform or challenge 
ethnic, national and religious solidarities. Tensions 
between Pakistan and Bangladesh persist, but how 
has this historical memory of conflict been carried 
forward into the diaspora?
Shahbag Square shows us the importance of 
history in the present, and Altab Ali Park shows 
us that this history informs experiences in the 
UK, but what is its role in the formation of British 
Muslim identities today? Do new attachments to 
place challenge exclusionary national identities 
or simplistic accounts of diasporic cultures, or 
do they create new exclusions and additional 
simplifications? And does the increasing role of 
religion in discourses around South Asian Muslims 
assuage ongoing tensions or shift the transnational 
political terrain?
Conclusion: Unpacking ‘the 
Muslim Community’
South Asian Muslims are still all too often 
represented in British popular discourse as a 
single monolithic bloc. The specific and variegated 
histories of social and political engagement that 
constitute the demotic and discordant, multi-
layered and contested ‘Muslim community’ have 
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been largely ignored. Exploring ‘intra-minority’ 
identity is, therefore, an important task. It expands 
our understanding of ‘hidden minorities’, as 
well as relations between and within minorities, 
bringing historicity and spatiality to bear on our 
understanding of Muslim identities in the UK. In 
recent weeks the struggles and solidarities of 
transnational political space have been stirred, 
and this project situates contemporary claims to 
citizenship and community in the UK within the 
context of a historical legacy that continues to 
shape the diasporic present.
Notes
1. The work of Saurabh Shukla, Tahmima Anam, 
Syed Zaim Al-Mahmood and Nick Cohen in 
particular is referred to in this paper.
2. A label that literally means ‘from the state 
of Bihar’ but is today associated with certain 
derogatory connotations.
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Introduction: British Justice 
for (Which) British Citizens?
When the campaigns against the extradition of 
Babar Ahmad, Talha Ahsan, Richard O’Dwyer and 
Gary McKinnon1 united to demand justice and 
make claims to British sovereignty, they collectively 
called for ‘British Justice for British Citizens’. Both 
reflecting and contesting a longstanding history 
of racial and religious exclusions of ‘Britishness’, 
the call for ‘British Justice’ made by British Muslim 
citizens illuminated the continuities between the 
colonial and the postcolonial, as well as pointing to 
the shifts. The altered terrain of the contemporary 
context was marked by the escalation of 
securitization under the War on Terror, which has 
singled out Muslims as the pre-eminent ‘suspect 
community’ and legitimized a host of measures 
which drastically curtail the civil liberties of all. In 
this context, the campaigns against extradition 
arrangements with the US, and the state responses 
to them, are revealing for what they expose 
about current articulations of racial (and religious) 
exclusion, and the boundaries of the nation. In 
particular, the narration of these four cases brought 
to the fore questions regarding the possibilities of 
British-Muslim citizenship, the boundaries of ‘British 
Justice’, and the racial fractures of nationalist 
identity invoked by the state for demarcating the 
borders of subjecthood.
Deciphering the Citizen
Significantly, the campaign for reform of the 
2003 US–UK Extradition Treaty drew different 
responses for each of the four men. Following an 
8- and 6-year battle respectively, whilst they were 
detained without trial, Babar Ahmad and Talha 
Ahsan lost their appeals against extradition in 
October 2012, along with three other Muslim men, 
when the European Court of Human Rights ruled 
that the prospective sentences faced by them in 
the US (80–100 years in solitary confinement) 
were not tantamount to torture. Ten days after their 
extradition, the Home Secretary ruled against the 
removal of Gary McKinnon, due to the vulnerability 
inferred from his Asperger’s syndrome, which put 
him at high risk of suicide. Declaring his case to be 
an ‘exception’, Theresa May’s decision displayed 
the humanitarianism offered to McKinnon that was 
at one and the same time denied to the Muslim 
men, whose health conditions also included 
Asperger’s, as well as severe clinical depression, 
diabetes and physical disabilities. Richard O’Dwyer, 
facing much less severe charges relating to 
copyright offences, was let off with a fine and an 
agreement with the US authorities not to infringe 
copyright laws again.
The specifics of the individual cases 
notwithstanding, the popular and political 
discourses debating extradition reform ultimately 
involved a narrative of who counted as British and 
who did not, of who could claim state protection 
and who could not. The simple answer, of course, 
was ‘British Justice for British Citizens’. But the 
white elephant in the room was what to do with 
the ‘British/Muslim’, the ‘enemy within’. Indeed, 
the suspension and increasing retraction of human 
rights and civil liberties under the War on Terror 
pushed for public comment on who could be 
treated with complete impunity, or even on who 
might be considered human. In a parliamentary 
debate on extradition in December 2011, where 
arguments were made for reform of the 2003 
US–UK Extradition Treaty, Dominic Raab MP 
expressed the view that ‘in taking the fight to the 
terrorists and the serious criminals after 9/11, 
the pendulum [had] swung too far the other way’ 
(House of Commons Debate, 2011: c.82). Of 
primary concern was how a legal process stripped 
of all intent to due process, designed for targeting 
13. Along the Fault Lines of ‘British Justice for British 
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‘the terrorist’, might also encompass the (white) 
British citizen. David Davis MP, for example, 
remarked:
We should keep in mind that the rather 
draconian process that we have, which was 
put in place to defend us against terrorism, 
does not appear to have had much impact 
in that respect … The truth of the matter is 
that we will have far more Gary McKinnons 
extradited than Osama bin Ladens. (House 
of Commons Debate, 2011: c.91)
Clearly while these draconian processes were 
right and acceptable for the ‘terrorist’ they were in 
danger too of catching the (white/Christian) British 
citizen. The binary Davis invoked between Gary 
McKinnon, a young white British working-class male, 
and Osama bin Laden not only framed all Muslims 
as ‘extremists’, as ‘terrorists’, it also denied the 
possibility of a British-Muslim subject-citizen.
Expelling the (Non-)Citizen
But extradition arrangements are only one of a host 
of measures, legitimated by the state through the 
War on Terror, which have brought to the fore the 
precariousness of citizenship, of self-hood and of 
sovereignty. Legislation passed in 2002 allowed the 
Home Secretary to deprive dual-nationality Britons 
of their citizenship on national security grounds 
without consent from the courts. Since 2003, of the 
21 British nationals who have had their citizenship 
removed, all but one or two are Muslim. Sixteen 
of these removals have occurred since 2010 
under the present government and at least five 
individuals were British-born, with one man having 
lived in the country for almost 50 years (Woods and 
Ross, 2013). Two of the men, Bilal al-Berjawi and 
Mohamed Sakr, were subsequently killed by US 
drones, and another, Mahdi Hashi, was rendered by 
US authorities and now awaits trial in the US.
A Coda
What then does this tell us about the meaning of 
‘British citizenship’ or, perhaps more pertinently, 
about the meaning of ‘British Justice’?  Clearly both 
have always depended on racial exclusions and 
qualifications, on processes of creating non-citizens. 
In the contemporary moment the construction of 
the terrorist as the ultimate enemy, both without 
and within, has reinvigorated processes of 
dehumanization on which racisms rely and through 
which the ‘non-citizen’ is created. The identification 
of ‘Muslim’ as synonymous with ‘terrorist’, of ‘terrorist 
suspect’ as synonymous with ‘guilt’, and of ‘terrorist’ 
as code for ‘irrational’, ‘uncivilized’, ‘religious 
extremist’, has permitted a host of draconian 
measures for disciplining, ultimately killing, Muslims, 
whilst actions of state terrorism are legitimated under 
‘national security’. When the campaigns against 
the extraditions of Babar Ahmad and Talha Ahsan 
lost their battles in October 2012, the blow to anti-
racist resistance was hard-felt, particularly amongst 
Britain’s Muslims. 
Did British citizenship count if you were Muslim? A 
precarious and ambivalent status, it seemed that 
regardless of ability to meet state requirements 
for being a ‘good citizen’, the protection of British 
sovereignty was never guaranteed and always 
racially qualified. As this disregard for British Muslim 
citizens is pursued – David Cameron’s appointment 
of Lynton Crosby as his election campaign manager 
being the latest example – perhaps the Muslim 
question is really one which entails continued, ever 
more brutal, state racism.
Notes
1. All four faced extradition to the US for accusations 
of web/computer-related offences carried out whilst 
they were resident in Britain. Babar Ahmad was the 
longest-serving prisoner in Britain detained without 
charge or trial between 2004 and 2012. The US 
alleged that in the 1990s he had been a supporter 
of terrorism, committing terrorism offences in the 
USA from 1996 to 2003. Talha Ahsan was arrested 
in 2006 in relation to the same case as Babar 
Ahmad and detained without trial until 2012. Gary 
McKinnon, released on bail, was indicted by the US 
in 2002, accused of hacking into 97 United States 
military and NASA computers over a 13-month 
period, and Richard O’Dwyer was indicted for 
copyright infringement for managing a website which 
signposted to other websites where pirated media 
was downloadable (an act not illegal in Britain).
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